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THE DUTIES OF A TRUSTEE WITH RESPECT TO DEFAULTED
MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS
PARKER BAILEY t AND CHARLES KEATING RICE
The prolonged stagnation of the realty market continues to create
difficulties of adjustment between legal precepts and economic reality. The
shrinkage in land values, accompanied by a flood of mortgage foreclosures,
has resulted in the emergence of a vast number of troublesome questions, of
pressing significance to lawyers occupied with real estate matters and to
fiduciaries charged with trust administration. The present discussion is
suggested, in particular, by the grave concern of fiduciaries over the problems
consequent upon the foreclosure of defaulted trust mortgages.
Mortgages have long been recognized as a proper medium for trust
funds,' and until recent years trustees generally have taken frequent advan-
tage of their availability for investment. Under favorable business condi-
tions the ready marketability both of mortgages and of mortgage participa-
tions has made such investments especially desirable. One may doubt
whether they would have met with such continued favor had the trustees
foreseen the numerous ways in which the administration of them would be
complicated by unfavorable business conditions.
In normal times it was only occasionally necessary for a trustee to
foreclose a trust mortgage ;2 now it has become an almost daily occurrence
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I. Bishop v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 5oS, 291 S. W. 718 (1927); Denton v.
Sanford, 1O3 N. Y. 6o7, 9 N. E. 49o (1886); In re Gouldey's Estate, 201 Pa. 491, 51 Atl. 315
(19o2). Such investments are now generally sanctioned by statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
(193o) § 4836; Fla. Laws 1931, c. 15064; Idaho Laws 1929, c. 20; ILu. REv. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1930) § 32, c. 148; IOWA CODE (1931) § 12772; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 40-
307; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 4706; LA. GEN. STAT. (1932) § 589; Mass. Laws 1932, C.
172, §51; MINN. GE. STAT. (1927) §7714; N. Y. DECEDEXT ESTATE LAW (1916) § iiI;
N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 21; OHIO PROBATE CODE (1931) § 10506-41; ORE.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-1214, as amended by Ore. Laws 1931, c. 278; PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, 193o) tit. 20, § 8oi; S. C. CODE (1932) § 9o5i; S. D. ComP. LAwS (1929) § 9o49; Tenn.
Pub. Acts 193i, c. IOO; TEx. REV. Crv. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 511; Vt. Public Laws
1933, § 67o6; VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, i93o) § 5431; WASH. ComP. STAT. (Remington,
1922) §3255; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 6, §2; Wis. STAT. (1g3i) §231.32; Wyo.
REv. STAT. (1931) § 10-305. See also Gouley, Real Estate Mortgage Bonds as Trust Invest-
mwnts (935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 953.
2. The absence, in normal times, of case law involving the problems now under discus-
sion is doubtless due to the fact that the trustee is seldom forced to bid in the property him-
self. Indeed, it is his duty to dispose of the property to others unless it is impossible to obtain
a fair price for it, for as a general rule, in the absence of statute or authority given by will,
investment of trust funds in lands is a breach of trust. Butler v. Butler, 164 Ill. 171, 45 N. E.
426 (1896); Jordan v. Jordan's Estate, I Me. 124, 88 At. 390 (913); Zimmerman v.
Frailey, 70 Md. 561, 17 Atl. 56o (1889) ; Smith v. Robinson, 83 N. J. Eq. 384, 9o Atl. 1O63
(Ch. 1914) ; In re Ahrend's Estate, 3 N. J. Misc. 746, 13o Atl. 219 (Orph. Ct. 1925), app.
dismissed, 99 N. J. Eq. 328, I3 Atl. 758 (Prerog. 1926) ; In re Leonard's Will, 202 Wis.
117, 230 N. W. 715 (1930). See 3 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs (935) § 678.
(57)
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for him to foreclose in order to liquidate the investment. Such a foreclosure
is amply supported by authority when necessary to preserve or to protect the
trust estate,3 but out of it arise the difficulties of administration which
embarrass the trustee. Frequently he is compelled, in the absence of other
bidders, to bid in the property himself.4  The resulting questions of the
allocation of carrying charges during the period while the property is being
held by the trustee as owner, of the disposition of income received during
the carrying period, and of apportionment of the proceeds resulting from
the final liquidation of the investment, are matters which heretofore the
trustee has only at intervals been called upon to face. Now they are his
immediate and principal concern.
More than thirty years ago a surrogate, confronted with the necessity
of offering a practicable solution for problems of this very type, declared:
"There must be some legal policy to govern trustees in the ad-
ministration of estates, because such a situation as now presented,
the investment on bond and mortgage, the foreclosure, the buying in,
the carrying until a favorable time for a sale, and the subsequent sale
at a profit, is in the business of testamentary trustees a matter of daily
occurrence. Trustees are entitled to have pointed out a rule which they
can follow without fear of having their conduct challenged. ... " 
Three decades of judicial consideration of the various questions, recurring
in each depression so to "challenge" trustees, have failed to bring wide-
spread or decisive approval of helpful rules from courts of last resort.
In the management and ultimate disposition of any trust investment
there is necessarily some conflict of interests between life tenant and
remainderman. In the case of defaulted trust mortgages, however, this
conflict is accentuated by the frequency with which specific problems of
3. Lockman v. Reilly, 95 N. Y. 64 (1884); Valentine v. Belden, 20 Hun 537 (N. Y.
i88o); JESSUP & REDFLD, LAW AND PRACncE mn THE SURROGATES' COURTS (3d ed. 1930)
§ 764.
4. "The plaintiff, as the administrator . . . , became possessed of the said bond and
mortgage as a part of her personal estate, and was authorized to collect the money due
thereon by the foreclosure of the mortgage, and it became his duty to resort to such remedy
when payment was neglected or refused. To save the estate from loss it was also his right
and duty to bid in the premises at the sale, and to hold the same until they could be disposed
of by him for the benefit of the estate which he represented." Ingalls, J., in Valentine v.
Belden, 20 Hun 537, 541 (N. Y. i88o). To the same effect: In re Bellah, 8 Del. Ch. 59, 67
Atl. 973 (Ch. 1896) ; In re Baker, 8 Del. Ch. 355, 68 AtI. 449 (Ch. 1899) ; 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 678. See also I PERRy, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 458.
The trustee is under a duty, however, to dispose of the property as soon as possible. Furniss v.
Cruikshank, 191 App. Div. 450, 181 N. Y. Supp. 522 (ist Dep't I92O), modified on other
grounds, 230 N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625 (92), 231 N. Y. 550, 132 N. E. 884 (1921) ; Willis v.
Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N. E. 486 (I9n).
In New York, since 1933 banking corporations which act as trustees have been specifi-
cally empowered to purchase real estate after foreclosure of a defaulted mortgage held by
them as trustees. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (1917) § iig. See also N. Y. BANKING LAw
(1916) § 188 (7), as amended by N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 323; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
(1916) § 111 (3), (4).
5. Silkman, S., in Matter of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 242, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550, 552-553
(Surr. Ct. 19o4).
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allocation of income and expenses arise, and by the lack of rules definitely
settling the respective rights of these parties. It is the purpose of this
discussion to consider the differing contentions of these parties, and to
see in what manner the trustee may resolve or compromise their conflicting
interests while safeguarding his own position as a fiduciary subject to
possible surcharge in the event of misapprehension of the proper rule.
I
DISPOSITION OF THE ULTIMATE PROCEEDS FROM SALE OF FoREcLOsED
TRUST PROPERTIES
Chronologically the last, yet perhaps the most important problem
which the trustee must meet in the sequence of events after foreclosure
of a defaulted trust mortgage, is the distribution of the proceeds remaining
from the final sale. The sale may result in a real profit; that is, a sur-
plus over the amount of the accrued unpaid interest, the original invest-
ment, and the expenses of liquidation. More often, under present con-
ditions, it will result in a loss, in that the final proceeds will be less than
the total amount of these items. In the latter event, the contention is
frequently made by the remainderman that since the amount of the original
investment cannot be restored, he is entitled to the full proceeds of the
sale. The life tenant, on the other hand, complains that this solution
of the difficulty thrusts the entire burden of the loss upon him, and
contends that in this, as in other situations 6 in which a loss is apportioned
in some manner between life tenant and remainderman, there should be
an equitable distribution of the burden.
Apportionment, both of income and of expenses, is a well-known
phase of trust administration. It is elementary that in the distribution
of trust funds, income goes to the life tenant, and principal, or corpus,
to the remainderman. Yet frequently, in computing the net income due
to the life tenant, it must be determined whether a given necessary expen-
6. The doctrine of equitable conversion, as it is invoked in the field of trusts of unpro-
ductive real property, represents an attempt by the courts to divide fairly the proceeds of sale
between capital and income. Where a testator establishes a trust of unproductive real
property, income to the life tenant and remainder over, with a mandatory power of sale in
the trustee, it is generally held that the life tenant is entitled to a share of the ultimate pro-
ceeds of sale, which share is to be determined as though the property had been immediately
converted into a productive investment at the testator's death. A sum is computed which,
invested on the date of the testator's death at the rate of interest normal for trust invest-
ments generally, could have produced the amount actually realized. This sum goes to prin-
cipal, the balance to income. See Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 561, io9 N. E. 611
(1915) ; Furniss v. Cruikshank, 23o N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625 (1921) ; Matter of Jackson,
258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932). Cf. Matter of Satterwhite, 262 N. Y. 339, 186 N. E.
857 (1933). The will must evidence an intent for an immediate conversion, however, or the
doctrine will not apply. Creed v. Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172 N. E. io6 (193o). But see
Equitable Trust Co. v. Kent, ii Del. Ch. 334, IOI Atl. 875 (1917). The doctrine has never
been held to apply to a vested remainder subject to an overriding life estate. See In re
Thirkdeld's Estate, 152 Misc. 280, 273 N. Y. Supp. 856 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1934); Note
(1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 306. See generally RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) §§ 240, 241.
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diture should be deducted wholly from income or from principal, or in
some manner from both. When the expenditure is calculated to benefit
the interests of both parties, it is only fair that they should share it, and it
is generally so held. Similarly, it is argued, when there is a realization
of funds following a period of default which has caused loss to both
parties, there should be an apportionment of the funds realized, since
neither was responsible for the deficit. The argument is carefully phrased
by -Vice-Chancellor James in a well-known English case:
"The true principle in all these cases is, that neither the tenant for
life nor the remainderman is to gain an advantage over the other-
neither is to suffer more damage in proportion to his estate and
interest than the other suffers-from the default of the obligor.
The two must share the loss in the same way as they would have
shared it had it occurred when they first became entitled in possession
to the fund." 7
Or, as Mr. Justice Cullen more picturesquely put the matter in a New York
Appellate Division case: "Why should the life tenant fast for twenty-
five years that the remainderman may feast at the end of that period?
Why should each not have exactly his own, so far as it is possible to
ascertain it?" 8
The case law on the question whether there should be such an appor-
tionment of the proceeds of sale between capital and income is largely
confined to cases in which the ultimate sale resulted in a loss. For this
reason, and in view of the additional fact that the question of apportion-
ment when the sale results in a profit is complicated by the seemingly
conflicting rule that accretions to a trust fund normally go to principal, it
has seemed advisable to discuss separately the apportionment of loss and
of profit.
A. Apportionment When Sale Results in Loss
The development of the apportionment doctrine in connection with
the sale of foreclosed trust properties may be conveniently traced through
a series of cases in each of which the sale resulted in a loss. Students
and writers in this field have been inclined to attribute the formulation
and growth of the doctrine to certain early English cases. As a matter
of fact, the first reported case allowing the life tenant a share in the
ultimate proceeds of sale is apparently an early and seldom-cited New York
case, Roosevelt v. Roosevelt.9 In this case, the testator owned at his
7. Cox v. Cox, L. R. 8 Eq. 343, 344 (1869).
8. Matter of Rogers, 22 App. Div. 428, 436, 48 N. Y. Supp. 175, 18I (2d Dep't 1897),
aff'd, 161 N. Y. 1O8, 55 N. E. 393 (1899).
9. 5 Redf. Surr. 264 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1881). For a fuller statement of the facts in-
volved in this case, see the earlier case of Scovel v. Roosevelt, 5 Redf. Surr. 121 (N. Y. Surr.
Ct. 1881).
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death a judgment of foreclosure for $8,595.22, and a mortgage on which
$5,711.66 was due. On the sale of the judgment the executor bid in the
premises, and he subsequently sold them for $7,530.15, which sum he
carried to the account of principal, the life tenants receiving no income until
the receipt of the proceeds of sale-a period of nearly three years. On fore-
closure of the mortgage, the executor received as net proceeds the sum of
$6,147.91, of which $5,711.66, the amount due at the date of the testator's
death, was carried on the capital account. The executor obviously felt that
instead of apportioning the proceeds, he should restore the amount of the
original investment before allocating anything to income. Upon a subsequent
reference, the referee apportioned the amount so received between capital
and income according to the rule that the "principal sum" is that sum which,
together with interest accruing thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum
from the date of the testator's death, would produce, by the time when the
proceeds were actually received, the total amount of such proceeds. The life
tenant thereupon entered objections to the application of this rule, despite the
fact that no precedent existed for the allocation of any part of the proceeds
to income. Surrogate Calvin, however, confirmed the report of the referee,
approving the rule applied, upon the authority of the English case of Cox v.
Co.10
The Cox case did not involve a mortgage foreclosure. By a marriage
settlement an obligor covenanted that there would be paid three months after
his death a fund to trustees, in trust for his widow for her life, with remainder
over to her children, with interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from
the date of his death until payment. Several years after his death, assets
were recovered which even then were insufficient to fulfill the covenant and
bond. Since the assets were insufficient to pay both the principal and interest
on this covenant, they were apportioned between the life tenant and the
remainderman. The life tenant was given that sum which, invested on the
day of the obligor's death at four per cent per annum, would have amounted,
with such interest, to the sum finally recovered.
The case most frequently referred to as the one in which the doctrine
of apportionment in the field of trust mortgages originated is another English
case, In re Moore." In this case, £8,ooo was invested in the trust mortgage.
The interest was not regularly paid, and the arrears amounted to £536 when
the property was foreclosed. £7,900 was realized on the sale. The court held
that the £7,900 should be apportioned between principal and income in the
ratio which £8,ooo bore to £536.
The further development of the equitable doctrine of apportionment
upheld in the Roosevelt and Moore cases was seemingly arrested by the New
io. Cox v. Cox, L. R. 8 Eq. 343 (1869).
II. 54 L. J. Ch. (N. s.) 432 (1885).
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York case of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hall. 12  The qualification,
"seemingly," is used advisedly, for the court did not question the validity of
the Roosevelt rule or its application in a proper case. The weakness of the
Hall case, from the point of view of an advocate of the apportionment doc-
trine, is that upon facts seeming to call for an application of the doctrine, the
court refused to allow any apportionment whatever. In this case, the testator
left one-half of the residue of his estate to trustees, to apply the income
thereof to the use of his daughter during her life, and at her death to convey
the share to her children, or to his grandchildren (the children of the testa-
tor's son) if she left no children surviving her. The executors invested
$37,000 in a mortgage in 1876. The mortgage was foreclosed by the sur-
viving trustee, who in 1879 bought in the property for $25,ooo. There had
also been invested $ii,ooo in another mortgage, which was foreclosed, and
in 188o also bought in by the trustee for $7,500. The first mentioned
property was subsequently sold for $45,ooo, and the other property for
$5,250. The general question before Surrogate Coffin was the distribution
of the funds on hand. The total sum invested in the mortgages was $48,ooo.
The total expenses were $4,68o.69. The total amount received for the prop-
erties on the subsequent sales was $50,250, which was a sum slightly less
than the total of the original investments plus the expenses of foreclosure,
maintenance, etc.
It was contended by the life tenant, the testator's daughter, that some
part of this sum should be allocated to income. Surrogate Coffin, however,
held that the entire proceeds were to be regarded as corpus, since they were
tantamount to a restoration of the original investment in the mortgages.
After discussing the rights of the parties to the fund, he concluded:
"No reason is discovered for going into any calculation as to what
portion of the fund to be distributed is to be regarded, as capital, and
what portion income, first, because there is no sum to be considered in
the light of income, and no question as between a life beneficiary
and remainderman, and second, because the loss or gain, occurred on
loans made by the trustees in the course of administration, in making
investments and not by the decedent. The case of Roosevelt v. Roose-
velt (5 Redf., 264) is, therefore, not in point." 13
Neither of the reasons given by the learned surrogate for his refusal to
apportion is especially persuasive. The statement that "there is no sum to
be considered in the light of income", and that therefore there should be no
apportionment, begs the question entirely, since whether or not there was
income to allocate was the very issue before the court. And since the life
tenant was insisting upon a distribution to income, it does not seem that the
12. 5 Demn. Surr. 73 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1887).
13. Id. at 8o.
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issue should have been summarily disposed of by the assertion that there was
"no question as between a life beneficiary and remainderman." 14
The second reason given by Surrogate Coffin, namely, that the rule of
apportionment is to be applied only to an investment made by the testator or
settlor, emphasizes a difference in the cases which would seem to be of little
practical importance. Since the principle of apportionment is calculated to
relieve the life tenant of an undue burden of loss, it should make no difference
whose investment resulted in the eventual deficit. Indeed, conditions en-
tirely beyond the control of any investor, either settlor or fiduciary, may
cause the investment to become unprofitable. 15
The Hall case did not have as deterrent an effect as it might conceivably
have had upon the evolution of the doctrine of apportionment, either in New
York or elsewhere; in fact, the case has been almost entirely ignored in
subsequent decisions. 16 Within a few years after the Hall decision the New
Jersey Court of Chancery, in the leading case of Hagan v. Platt,T adopted
the rule of apportionment enunciated in the English cases. The Hagan case
involved facts substantially similar to those in the Moore case, the sale having
yielded an amount slightly larger than the original investment, but much
smaller than the aggregate total of principal plus unpaid interest. The New
Jersey courts have consistently followed the Hagan case,"' and the law ap-
pears to be settled in that jurisdiction, however uncertain it may be in others.
In the dubious state of the law in New York, caused by the Hall case
and others to be reviewed later in this discussion, those who favor the appor-
tionment doctrine rely strongly upon the case of Meldon v. Devlin,19 the
only case in which the New York Court of Appeals has indicated approval
of the doctrine. In this case the trustees sold two lots upon which they origi-
nally held two mortgages, aggregating about $25,000. In I885 the mort-
gages were foreclosed, and the trustees bought in the property. In 1893 the
surviving trustee sold it for a sum less than the principal and interest of the
original mortgages. Judge Barrett, writing for the majority in the Appel-
late Division, approved the application of a rule of apportionment, saying:
14. The surrogate had earlier stated in the course of his opinion that it did not appear
whether the life tenant had issue to take the remainder after her life interest terminated.
After making the statement discussed above, he added that if the life tenant had issue who
were remaindermen as to her share, they were not parties to this proceeding, and their rights
could not be affected by this adjudication. Id. at 81.
15. In Matter of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Surr. Ct. 19o4), a rule of
apportionment was applied notwithstanding the fact that the investment was by the execu-
tors, not by the testator.
I6. Professor Bogert refers to it as a "rather unusual" case. 4 BOGERT, TRusTs AND
TRusTEEs (935) § 820, n. 30.
17. 48 N. J. Eq. 2o6, 21 Atl. 86o (Ch. i8gi).
i8. In re Tuttle, 49 N. 3. Eq. 259, 24 Atl. i (Prerog. i892) ; Trenton Trust & Safe De-
posit Co. v. Donnelly, 65 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 Atl. 92 (Ch. i9o3) ; Equitable Trust Co. v. Swo-
boda, 113 N. J. Eq. 399, 167 Atl. 525 (Ch. 1933).
I9. 3 App. Div. 146, 52 N. Y. Supp. 172 (ist Dep't i898), aff'4 on opinion below, i67
N. Y. 573, 6o N. E. iii6 (igoi).
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"It is well settled that when the interest upon mortgages is unpaid, and
the premises are eventually sold, the sum received should be ratably
apportioned between principal and income. (2 Lewin Trusts [Am. ed.
1889], 1228; In re Moore, 54 L. J. Ch. 432; Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J.
Eq. 206.) . This is not a case of devastavit; and cases like Cook v.
Lowry (95 N. Y. 103) have no application." 20
Two justices in the Appellate Division dissented from this opinion on other
grounds. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam the decision
of the Appellate Division on Judge Barrett's majority opinion.
21
If emphasis were needed to establish more firmly the doctrine of the
Meldon case in New York law, it was given by Surrogate Silkman in Matter
of Marshall,22 which contains a discussion in many respects the clearest and
fullest to be found on the subject in the New York decisions. 23 Interestingly
enough, the surrogate's opinion discloses the fact that the Meldon case was
not cited by counsel for either party. In any event, the Marshall decision
has had the effect of gaining for the Meldon case a degree of importance and
general recognition which it might not otherwise have achieved.
24
For more than a decade the rule established by the Meldon and Marshall
cases was regarded as settled law in New York,25 and even thereafter the
serenity of practitioners and fiduciaries was not disturbed by a case which,
had it obtained more widespread notice, might have caused them serious con-
cern. In Matter of Brooklyn Trust Co. (Weaver Estate),26 the surrogate's
opinion was concerned only with the question of the allocation of carrying
20. 31 App. Div. at 158, 53 N. Y. Supp. at i8o.
21. 167 N. Y. 573, 6o N. E. 1116 (igoi). Two judges in the Court of Appeals did not
vote.
22. 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 55o (Surr. Ct. 19o4).
23. Professor Bogert states that in some cases "it is held that trust capital must be re-
placed first, income second, and that the balance, if any, must go to trust capital." He
cites, among other cases in support of this proposition, the Marshall case. 4 BoGaRT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 820. This is misleading, however, for the Marshall case approves a
rule of apportionment which would give to the life tenant a proportionate share of the pro-
ceeds of sale, without preference either to the life tenant or to the remainderman as to pri-
ority of distribution. In the Marshall case it appeared that the life tenants were satisfied to
accept the amount remaining after the original investment was restored, but it is clear that
they might have insisted upon a proportionate distribution, in which case there would not
have been a complete restoration of principal.
24. Surrogate Silkman attributes the omission of counsel to cite a decision so authorita-
tive, to the fact that "the compilers of our working digests seem to have failed to appreciate
the importance of the rule established." 43 Misc. 238, 245, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550, 554 (Surr.
Ct. 1904).
25. In Matter of Olmstead, 52 App. Div. 515, 66 N. Y. Supp. 212 (ist Dep't igoo), aff'd
without opinion, 164 N. Y. 571, 58 N. E. 1O9O (19oo), the trustee invested in a mortgage
which it became necessary to foreclose. After considerable delay the property was sold,
leaving a large deficiency. The expenses of foreclosure and the taxes were charged against
the estate by the trustee, but it does not appear from the report whether there was any ap-
portionment of the proceeds of sale.
26. 92 Misc. 674, 157 N. Y. Supp. 547 (Surr. Ct. 1915), aff'd ivithout opinliol, 173 App.
Div. 948, 158 N. Y. Supp. 11o9 (2d Dep't 1916), 219 N. Y. 565, 114 N. E. io6i (1916).
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charges where the trustee had foreclosed a trust mortgage and still held title
to the property. Certain buildings on the property held by the trustee were
damaged by fire, and the trustee took, in place of the buildings, moneys
received under an insurance policy. The trustee received further moneys upon
the sale of the properties. There is no mention in the surrogate's opinion
as to what disposition was, or should be, made either of the proceeds received
under the insurance policy or of those received from the sale of the prop-
erties. In the memorandum in the Court of Appeals 27 it appears, however,
that the surrogate had overruled an objection to the trustee's accounts, made
by the life tenant on the ground that the proceeds of the fire insurance policy
should have been apportioned between principal and income. The Court of
Appeals, as the Appellate Division had done, affirmed without opinion the
decree of the surrogate, refusing to apportion these proceeds.
Since there was no opinion in either of the appellate courts, and since the
surrogate's opinion did not discuss the question of apportionment, this case
attracted little attention among lawyers and fiduciaries, and even now, because
of the very character of the decisions, there is a tendency to discount it as an
authoritative one. Furthermore, as will be pointed out in the discussion of
carrying charges, the surrogate seems to have based his opinion concerning
that point largely upon cases in the field of trusts of unproductive real prop-
erty, and to have ignored cases which involved the very points in issue.28
And although the record in both appellate courts discloses that the surrogate
denied apportionment both of the proceeds from the sale and from the fire
insurance policy,29 the memorandum in the Court of Appeals makes no men-
tion of a contention by the life tenant that there should have been an appor-
tionment of the proceeds from the sale. This may indicate that the court's
attention was centered upon the proceeds from the policy, and that full con-
sideration was not given to the fact that proceeds resulting from the ultimate
sale following foreclosure of a trust mortgage were also to be distributed.
Whatever its implications may be, the Brooklyn Trust Co. case had little
immediate effect upon trust administration. Lawyers generally, as well as
those courts which were faced squarely with the problem, continued to follow
27. 2i9 N. Y. 565, 114 N. E. io6i (1916).
28. The appellant, both in the Appellate Division and in the Court of Appeals, cited but
one case in his entire brief, and this a case'which dealt with the problem only by analogy-
Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 561, io9 N. E. 611 (,9,S)-a case involving a trust of un-
productive real estate, accompanied by an imperative power of sale. The Meldon and the
Marshall cases (mtpra notes 19, 22), which were clear authority for the appellant's position,
were not mentioned in his brief.
29. The following quotation from the respondent's brief, in both appellate courts, is of
interest: "We do not think that the question of the apportionment between principal and in-
come of the amount received by the Trustee for the fire loss and sale of the property can be
seriously argued and therefore, we shall not discuss it on our brief." Italics added.
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a rule of apportionment.3" Although the question was not frequently liti-
gated, other jurisdictions adhered to this theory.31
Ignored in practice and as precedent, the Brooklyn Trust Co. case
seemed destined to ultimate characterization as a "sporadic" one. The doubt
which it caused has been recently revived, however, in a manner especially
alarming to New York fiduciaries who had come to regard the doctrine of
apportionment as a settled one in this field. The New York Appellate Divi-
sion in the Second Judicial Department, silent for nearly twenty years on the
subject, has reaffirmed in Matter of Chapal 3 2 its position taken in the Brook-
lyn Trust Co. case. In the Chapal case, $20,000 was invested by the execu-
tors in mortgages which were later turned over to the trustees. Two of the
mortgagors defaulted, whereupon the trustees foreclosed the mortgages and
bid in the properties at the foreclosure sale. The trustees advanced all of the
carrying charges. It appeared that one of the foreclosed properties produced
no income, while the other produced a surplus over carrying charges. The
trustees sought instructions as to what should be done with the proceeds if
the properties were sold. The surrogate of Nassau County held that when
any particular parcel was sold, "the proceeds should be properly allocated as
between principal and income." The opinion in the Appellate Division is
concerned for the most part with the allocation of carrying charges, but at
the conclusion of the opinion, and without citation of authorities, it is stated
that the decree of the surrogate providing that the proceeds of sale be appor-
tioned between principal and income should be modified to provide that the
proceeds of sale be added to principal. Unfortunately, most of the attention
of court and counsel appears to have been directed to the question of alloca-
tion of carrying charges, and, as in the Brooklyn Trust Co. case, the problem
30. In re Myers' Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp. III1 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1916) ; Matter of Chapel,
N. Y. L. J., Dec. 23, 1924 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1924); Matter of Jackson, 135 Misc. 329, 239
N. Y. Supp. 362 (Surr. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 425, 25o N. Y. Supp. 324 (2d Dep't
1931), ree'd on other grounds, 258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932), reargument denied, 258
N. Y. 61o, i8o N. E. 354 (1932) ; fMatter of Ely, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 3, 1933, at 16o8 (N. Y.
Surr. Ct. 1933).
In Furniss v. Cruikshank, 191 App. Div. 450, 181 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Ist Dep't ig2o),
inodified on other grounds, 230 N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625 (1921), 231 N. Y. 550, 132 N. E. 884
(i921), the loss on a mortgage investment was $6,937.74. The trustee charged this loss to
capital. It does not appear from the report that any apportionment of the proceeds of sale
took place or that any was contemplated. That the case is not to be regarded as authority
against apportionment, however, is indicated by the following excerpt from Farb, Distribu-
tion of Proceeds on Sale of Properties under Foreclosed Mortgages (1933) 58 TRusT CoM-
PANIES 245, 249: "An examination of the case on appeal [Furniss v. Cruikshank] shows that
no claim was made for the apportionment between principal and income of' the proceeds of
sale. Had such apportionment been made, it is evident that the loss sustained by the principal
account would have been greater. The referee who was appointed to take and state the ac-
count of the trustees stated in his report:
"'The life tenants did not complain of their loss of income and have not asked to appor-
tion the proceeds of sale between principal and income as might be done.'"
31. Wallace v. Wallace, go S. C. 61, 72 S. E. 553 (1911) ; In re Hubbuck, [1896] 1 Ch.
754; In re Alston, [1901] 2 Ch. 584; In re Atkinson, [19o4] 2 Ch. 16o; Stewart v. Kingsale,
[19o2] I Ir. 496; In re Plumb, 27 Ont. 5O1 (1896).
32. 28o N. Y. Supp. 811, 245 App. Div. 818 (2d Dep't 1935). This case is also reported
in N. Y. L. J. July 2, 1935, at 21, sub nor. Matter of Olvany.
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of apportionment seems not to have received the full consideration which it
merited.
To summarize, it may be said that as far as judicial authority is con-
cerned, in those jurisdictions. outside of New York where the question has
arisen, the cases have consistently favored apportionment. The majority of
cases in New York have likewise reached this result, but the Brooklyn Trust
Co. and Chapal cases cause uneasiness to those whose duty it is to advise
fiduciaries. Yet in theory and practice there would seem to be no reasonable
objection to the rule.33 It is obviously unfair that one party should bear the
entire loss, particularly since the life tenant is usually the primary object of
the settlor's or testator's bounty. In some jurisdictions the rule has been
followed for over half a century, and whatever variants there may be in its
practical application, it has been found to achieve a uniformly equitable result.
B. Apportionment When Sale Results in Profit
Even those courts which have unhesitatingly adopted a rule of appor-
tionment in cases involving a sale which resulted in loss have not been wholly
in accord on the question whether there should be an apportionment when
the sale results in profit. The principle that any increase in the value of real
estate should go to corpus is well established in the law of trusts.34 Some
courts and judges have regarded this principle as controlling the disposition
of surplus over and above the original investment plus unpaid interest, etc."0
Other courts have felt that the purchase of real estate by the trustee repre-
sents an investment of both principal and income, and that consequently each
should share in any profit resulting from the ultimate sale. The litigated
cases involving such a profit are few, but they clearly exhibit the conflicting
points of view.
The first case on the subject appears to be an early New York one,
Schoonmaker v. Van Wyck. 30  A testatrix left one-third of her estate to be
invested in bonds and mortgages on real estate and to be held in trust for one
Isaac Van Wyck during his life, with remainder over. The executors in-
vested in a mortgage which it became necessary to foreclose. Unable to find
a purchaser, the executors themselves acquired the title at the foreclosure sale.
33. See Farb, supra note 3o; Newhall, Apportionment of Losses on Mortgage Fore-
closures (Aug. 1933) 18 MAss. L. Q. 81; 2 JARmAN, WmI.s (7th ed. 193o) 1205; 2 PEaay,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 548c.
34. First National Bank v. Lee, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1897, 66 S. W. 413 (1902) ; First Na-
tional Bank v. Mulholland, 123 Miss. 13, 85 So. III (192o) ; Outcault v. Appleby, 36 N. J.
Eq. 73 (Ch. 1882) ; 2 PmRy, TRUSTS AND TRUSTE-S (7th ed. 1929) § 547; see Note (1921)
13 A. L. R. ioo4, 1017.
35. Farb, supra note 30, at 247, takes this position. DoDGE, ESTATE ADmINIsTRATIoN
AND ACCOUNTING (932), Supp. No. I (1933) 293, is also of this opinion. Contra: RESTATE-
mENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 241, comment c.
36. 31 Barb. 457 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1860) ; see (1925) 23 MIc3E. L. RLv. 431.
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They held the premises for about fifteen years, and then disposed of them
at a price which was nearly $8,ooo more than the amount paid at the fore-
closure sale. The court held, in substance, that out of the proceeds there
should first be restored the amount of the original investment; that secondly
unpaid interest should be satisfied; and that finally whatever remained of
the fund should be allocated to principal. The effect of the decision is to give
to principal all of the profit remaining after replacing the original principal
and accrued interest.
An apparently similar result was reached some years later by a New
Jersey court in Parker v. Johnson.3 In this case the trustee held a defaulted
trust mortgage. He foreclosed it and bought in the real estate. Later he
sold the property and realized about $1,700 more than the amount of the
principal and interest on the investment and of costs, carrying charges, and
expenses. There were three other pieces of property, of which the trustee
was in possession, either as mortgagee or under a foreclosure, on which the
trust fund might incur a loss. The life tenant asked that the $1,70o be
applied to the payment of arrears of interest on suspended investments. The
court denied that this sum was income to which the life tenant was entitled,
and held that it was the duty of a trustee to use the profit on one investment
to make up the loss on others. 38 The language of Chancellor Rfinyon is of
interest, albeit a bit ambiguous:
"There are no arrears on the investment which was made on the Orange
Street property. They have all been paid out of the proceeds of the
sale of the property by the trustee. There are arrears of interest on the
suspended investments, and the question is whether the life tenant is
entitled to be paid those arrears out of the profit on the sale, or whether
the profit should be held to make up a possible if not probable deficiency
in the principal through losses on the suspended investments. The profit
is not income. It was made by the trustee in the process of converting
the investment, and, like a premium realized on the sale of government
bonds in which the fund might be invested, it belongs to the fund. The
trustee in this case is to keep the fund invested, and the tenant for life is
entitled to the interest. It is clearly the duty of the trustee to apply the
profits on one investment to making up the losses on others." 39
37. 37 N. J. Eq. 366 (Ch. 1883).
38. In Parker v. Seeley, 56 N. J. Eq. iio, 38 Atl. 280 (Ch. 1897)4 although the court
reached a substantially contrary result, it attempted to distinguish the case of Parker v.
Johnson on the ground that in the Johnson case the trustee was ordered by the court to retain
the surplus, and not to apply it to either principal or interest until it appeared whether or not
there might be a loss on some of the other investments held under the same trust. The court
in the Seeley case therefore argued that the Johnson case was not direct authority for the
proposition that all of the profit should go to corpus. It added parenthetically that the court
in the Johnson case did not have before it all of the authorities on the question. Despite this
attempted distinction, the Johnson case is generally cited for the proposition that profit should
go to corpus rather than be apportioned. See 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (i935) § 820;
Equitable Trust Co. v. Swoboda, 113 N. J. Eq. 399, 401, 167 Atl. 525, 526 (Ch. 1933).
39. 37 N. J. Eq. at 368 (883). Italics added.
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The doctrine of Parker v. Johnson has been reiterated by way of dictum in a
recent New Jersey case.4°
In Parker v. Johnson the life tenant might have been successful if,
instead of contending that the surplus should be applied to arrears of interest
on other investments, he had urged that this fund should be apportioned
between the respective parties. Another instance in which a life tenant failed
to avail himself of his best argument for obtaining a share of the surplus is
found in the Ohio case of Willis v. Holcomb.41  Here a part of the trust
estate consisted of a mortgage. The mortgagor having defaulted in interest,
an action was brought to foreclose the mortgage. The trustee found it nec-
essary to purchase the land at the foreclosure sale in order to protect the trust
estate. At the time the case was decided, the trustee was still in possession,
and the property had greatly increased in value. The life tenant brought a
suit to compel the trustee to sell the property and, after paying to the life
tenant the surplus over the original investment, to reinvest the proceeds. It
appeared that the life tenant had been in possession of the real estate and
received rents and profits therefrom. The court accordingly held that since
the life tenant had accepted the benefits of the land in lieu of the interest that
he would have received on the investment, he could not demand a further
amount equaling what the fund would have earned had it been at interest.
The court held, however, that the life tenant was entitled to receive, out of
the proceeds of sale, the difference by which the amount of interest that the
fund would have earned had it been kept invested under the terms of the will
exceeded the amount he had actually received in the form of rents and profits
from the land. Our present interest, however, is chiefly with the distribution
of the funds which was ordered by the court. The court directed that out
of the proceeds of sale there should be taken, first, an amount equal to the
original trust fund; and secondly, the amount, if any, which the life tenant
had not estopped himself from claiming by reason of his acceptance of the
rents and profits. Any balance remaining, the court held, should be added to
the principal. As in the Johnson case, the life tenant did not specifically ask
for an apportionment of the profit. But the case, as it stands, must be taken
as authority for the proposition that a profit resulting from the ultimate sale
should be allocated to corpus.
The courts of New Jersey, where the problem of apportionment seems
to have arisen more often than in any other jurisdiction, have been unable
to agree upon a uniform rule of distribution, where the ultimate sale resulted
in profit. Several years after Parker v. Johnson was decided, the New
Jersey Court of Chancery was again confronted with the question of the dis-
position of a profit resulting from the sale of foreclosed trust properties. In
40. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Swoboda, n3 N. J. Eq. 399, 401, x67 At. 525, 526 (Ch.
1933).
41. 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N. E. 486 (i9n).
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Parker v. Seeley,42 it was held that the profit should be divided between the
life tenant and the remainderman in the proportion which the unpaid interest
bore to the principal invested in the mortgage. This case is of especial
significance because it introduces for the first time into the case law in this
field the concept of the purchase of the real estate by the trustee as an invest-
ment of both capital and income. Vice-Chancellor Pitney, in an illuminating
opinion, also declared that the same rule which governs the apportionment of
a loss resulting from the foreclosure of a trust mortgage should control the
disposition of a profit arising under these circumstances. His language is as
follows:
"It will be observed that the real estate was purchased with the funds
of the estate, consisting partly of principal and partly of interest; the
principal belonging to the remainder-man, and the interest to the tenant
for life. This subject was dealt with, in the case of a loss arising under
such circumstances, in the case of Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 2o6, 21
Atl. 86o; and the doctrine there laid down was followed and applied by
the chancellor in Tuttle's Case, 49 N. J. Eq. 262, 24 Atl. i. The rule so
established is that in case of a loss the deficiency is to be divided between
the tenant for life and the remainder-man in the proportion which the
principal represented by the investment bears to the interest which was
in arrear, and also represented by the investment. And it seems to me
that the same principle applies to the case where a profit, instead of a loss,
arises. . . . The consideration which seems to control is that the prop-
erty purchased represents both principal and interest, and its growth ill
value is due to both sources. . . .," 43
The rule of Parker v. Seeley has been upheld in two subsequent New Jersey
cases, 44 but, as previously indicated, a dictum in the most recent case 45 on
the subject reverts to the earlier position of allocating all profit to corpus.
4 6
42. 56 N. J. Eq. Iio, 38 AtI. 280 (Ch. 1897).
43. Id. at 114, 38 AtI. at 281. Italics added.
44. McCoy v. McCloskey, 94 N. J. Eq. 6o, 117 Atl. 473 (Ch. 1922) ; Skinner v. Boyd, 98
N. J. Eq. 55, 13o Atl. 22 (Ch. I925), afftd, Ioo N. J. Eq. 355, 134 Ati. 919 (1926).
45. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Swoboda, 113 N. J. Eq. 399, 401, 167 At. 525, 526 (Ch.
1933).
46. New Jersey is also one of the few jurisdictions which have passed on the question
whether the fact that the mortgage was a purchase money mortgage should make any differ-
ence in the applicability of the rules herein discussed. This question arose in Burnett v.
Witschief, 96 N. 3. Eq. 71, 126 AtI. 23 (Ch. 1924), (1925) 23 MIcE. L. REv. 431. In this
case a parcel of real estate forming a part of the corpia of a trust for the testator's widow
was sold under a power of sale. The executors accepted a purchase money mortgage in pay-
ment. Thereafter they foreclosed the mortgage and bought back the property to save the
investment. Seven years later they again sold the property at an increase over the price of
the first sale. The widow claimed that the increase should be apportioned between life tenant
and remainderman, such apportionment to be based upon the sum of interest which would
have accrued to her on the foreclosed mortgage if it had not been foreclosed, and the interest
had been paid. The court held: (i) that the sale of the real estate under the power given in
the will worked no conversion; (2) that the mortgage taken in payment remained realty in
the hands of the executors, in trust for the life tenant and remainderman; (3) that the net
yield of the property, whether from the mortgage or from the land itself, when held by the
executor, in the form of rents and profits, belonged to the life tenant;' (4) that the increased
price of the second sale belonged to principal; (5) but that since the life tenant would have
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The argument for apportionment of profit is thus bottomed on the prop-
osition that the foreclosed property represents an investment of both capital
and unpaid interest. If at the time of foreclosure there is no interest in
arrears, most authorities would doubtless agree that since there is no invest-
ment of income in the property, all profit should be added to principal. This
was the result apparently reached in a New York case, Van Vleck v. Louns-
bery.4 7 This case is complicated, however, by the fact that the life tenant re-
ceived, in addition to the interest on the mortgage, the rents from the
property during the time it was being held by the trustee. It is probable
that the court, like the,Ohio court in Willis, v. Holcomb,4 8 was influenced in
its decision by some element of estoppel occasioned by the acceptance of rents.
If, as in the Ohio case, there was a default in interest, the "estoppel" argu-
ment is not persuasive, since the life tenant has an investment in the prop-
erty, and the rents should constitute only a pro tanto deduction from his
share of the ultimate proceeds. On its peculiar facts, however, the Van
Vleck decision is one with which few would be disposed to quarrel.49
To recapitulate, although the decisions have been about equally divided
on the question of apportionment of the proceeds of sale when a profit results,
had the rents from the land if the sale fhad not taken place, and since she suffered a loss of
income due to a default in interest on the mortgage, she should be recompensed out of the
final proceeds of sale to the extent of the amount of rents she would have received if the
property had not been sold. The net income of the land for the period of default was to be
determined from the average net yearly income 'during the possession of the life tenant and
the executor.
This decision is in effect a holding that the normal rules of apportionment do not apply
to a purchase money mortgage. It is not perceived why there should be any real distinction
between the treatment of this type of mortgage and that of any other. The life tenant is en-
titled to the interest from the purchase money mortgage, whatever its duration may be. If
there is a default in the interest, the life tenant has sustained a loss as genuine as that in any
other case. The purchase of the property at the foreclosure sale again represents an invest-
ment which includes the unpaid interest. It is true that if there had been an outright sale of
the property, the life tenant would not have been entitled to share in the proceeds in the ab-
sence of facts calling for an application of the doctrine of equitable conversion, but the fact
remains that the life tenant has suffered a loss in interest from the mortgage, and the loss so
resulting should not be borne entirely by him.
Apparently contrary to the Burnett case is McCoy v. McCloskey, 94 N. J. Eq. 6o, 117
Atl. 473 (Ch. 1922), wherein it was said that if a purchase money mortgage is to be re-
garded as merged in the legal title upon the foreclosure sale, then upon a sale at a profit, the
life tenant would be entitled to a proportionate share of the proceeds. Cf. Matter of Ward-
man, 154 Misc. 255, 276 N. Y. Supp. 778 (Surr. Ct. 1935), wherein the rules as to the alloca-
tion of carrying charges upon the foreclosure of a trust mortgage were applied without refer-
ence to the fact that the mortgage involved was a purchase money mortgage.
47. 34 Hun 569 (N. Y. 1885).
48. 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N. E. 486 (1911).
49. A difficult question would be presented by a case in which there was no default in
interest at the time of foreclosure, but in which the trusted carried the foreclosed property
for a long period of time with little or no income to the life tenant in the interim. Under the
theory advanced by Vice-chancellor Pitney, the right of the dife tenant to share in the pro-
ceeds of the ultimate sale is based upon the fact that the trustee's bid at the foreclosure sale
represents both principal and unpaid interest. In the hypothetical case suggested, there would
obiously be no investment of income at the outset, but it might be argued that ultimately in-
come would be represented in the property, and that in any event all of the equities in favor
of the life tenant are present. Certainly this would be true in the case of a sale resulting in
loss, and it will be recalled that apportionment was an equitable doctrine even before the
"investment' theory was developed.
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the better view would seem to be that there should be an apportionment of
the surplus. This does not do violence to the usual rule that an increase in
the value of real estate should go to corpus, since the cases which have estab-
lished this general rule are not cases in which the life tenant had any direct
interest or investment in the property itself. If, as Vice-Chancellor Pitney
has declared, the growth in value is due to both principal and interest, each
should have a proportionate share in the proceeds if the joint venture proves
successful. 50
C. Basis on Which Apportionment of Proceeds Should Be Made
Although the cases outside of New York are fairly uniform in directing
an apportionment of the proceeds of sale, at least in the event of a loss, there
has not been as complete agreement on the method of apportionment. In
the earliest case in which a loss was involved, Roosevelt v. Roosevelt,51 the
court employed what might be called the recapitalization method. Under this
method a sum is ascertained which would produce, together with interest at
the rate to which the life tenant is entitled, the amount received on the final
sale. This sum is distributed to the remainderman, and the difference be-
tween it and the amount actually received is given to the life tenant. This
formula for apportionment was derived from a similar one employed in the
English case of Cox v. Cox.
52
The English case of In re Moore 53 approached the solution somewhkt
differently. It will be recalled that in this case the original investment was
£8,ooo. The arrears in interest amounted to £536. £7,900 was realized on
50. One further profit case, In re Park's Estate, 173 Pa. 190, 33 Atl. 884 (I896), de-
serves mention. Here a testator left his estate to his executors in trust to receive and collect
the rents of the real estate and the income and profits of the personal estate, and after de-
ducting taxes and certain annuities, to pay the residue of the net income to his daughter for
her life, with remainder over. The executors invested part of the estate in mortgages, which
were subsequently foreclosed. They bid in the property for the amounts of the mortgages in
order to protect the estate. At a subsequent sale of the properties a profit resulted. The
court held that after restoring the amount of the original investment, the residue belonged to
the life tenant. The result in this case appears to be due to the language of the will, which
stated that all income and profits of the personal estate should go to the life tenant. The
court reasoned that by equitable conversion the foreclosed real estate remained personalty.
and that as a consequence the profit on the sale was "income and profits" of the personal
estate. 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES (1935) § 820, states that cases granting such a profit
to the life tenant as income seem unexplainable, but that the Park case may be rationalized
on the basis of the testator's express intent.
51. 5 Redf. Surr. 264 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 188i). It is interesting to note that Surrogate
Calvin apparently first considered applying the rule now known as the "Meldon rule," but for
some reason rejected it. He said at page 266: "The natural first impression, in considering
this case, was to ascertain the amount of loss of principal and of interest, by a computation
of interest upon the amount due to the decedent at his death upon the respective obligations
referred to, deduct the amount realized from the principal and interest thus computed, and
charge to the respective beneficiaries the amount of the loss, in proportion to their interests,
respectively, so ascertained. But a moment's reflection showed that that was an erroneous
basis, for the reason that the amount due at the death was not realized, and therefore was not
a proper statement of the remainder-man's interest. Hence, it becomes necessary to adopt
some rule, by which it can be ascertained what the equitable proportion of the loss sustained
is.
52. L. R. 8 Eq. 343 (I869).
53. 54 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 432 (885).
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the sale. The court held that the £7,900 should be apportioned in the ratio
which £8,ooo bore to £536. This method was adopted in the well-known
New Jersey case of Hagan v. PlattF and it was introduced into the law of
New York by the case of Meldon v. Devlin.55 The language of these cases
is to the effect that the fund should be apportioned in the ratio of the aggre-
gate principal to the whole unpaid interest. The use of the term, "ratio", is
somewhat confusing, in the practical application of the formula, since it
implies a direct fractional relation between aggregate principal and the whole
unpaid interest. What actually happens may best be illustrated symbolically.
Let P represent the aggregate principal, i the unpaid interest, and C the pro-
ceeds; let the life tenant's share of the proceeds be represented by r and the
remainderman's share by X. The proper solutions will then be:
i A P X
=-- ,and - = -. 56
P+i C P+i C
The difference between the Roosevelt and Meldon formulas is not so
great as might be supposed. Indeed, an application of either formula would
arrive at the same result, if the same rate of interest were taken in computing
the amount due the life tenant in each formula. It is only when a different
rate of interest is employed that it becomes important which formula is used.
The distinction is not academic, for some courts, as will be shown later in
the course of this discussion, have allowed to the life tenant the mortgage
rate of interest throughout the entire period of default, others have allowed
the mortgage rate until the date of foreclosure and the prevailing rate there-
after, while still others have allowed only the prevailing rate throughout the
period in question. The Roosevelt formula appears to have had no following
in the cases either in New York or elsewhere, 57 and the custom of trustees
54. 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 Atl. 86o (Ch. I89I).
55. 31 App. Div. 146 (Ist Dep't i898), aff'd on opinion below, 167 N. Y. 573 (,go,).
56. That this is the formula actually applied by the courts is illustrated by the case of
Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 Atl. 86o (Ch. 1891). In this case, the principal involved
was ,200. the unpaid interest $1,252, and the proceeds $1,267.94. The court accordingly dis-
tributed $62o.52 to principal and $647.42 to income.
57. The UNIFORM PRI.NcIPAL AND INCOME Act [see 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1934) 114; Ore.
Laws 1931, c. 371] posits a rule which is in some ways suggestive of the Roosevelt formula.
The Uniform Act does not draw any distinction between unproductive property held by the
trustee as a part of the original trust estate, and unproductive property held by the trustee as
the result of the foreclosure of a trust mortgage. This is probably due to the fact that the
Uniform Act does not require an intent on the part of the testator to effect an equitable con-
version in order to bring about an apportionment of the proceeds of the sale of unproductive
property. See Brandis, Truest Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds, of Sale of Un-
productive Land and of Expenses (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 127; jNote (1930) 40 YALE L. J.
275.
Section ii of the Uniform Act provides that the amount to be credited to income shall
be the difference between the net proceeds received from the property and the amount which,
had it been placed at simple interest at the rate of five per cent per annum, would (with the
interest) have produced the net proceeds. The section states in part: "(2) Such income
shall be the difference between the net proceeds received from the property and the amount
which, had it been placed at simple interest at the rate of five per centum per annum for the
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
has been to utilize the Meldon formula whenever apportionment becomes
necessary.
The rule of Hagan v. Platt and Meldon v. Devlin left two questions
somewhat uncertain: (i) What is included within the term, "aggregate prin-
cipal"? (2) On what basis is the "whole. unpaid interest" to be computed?
In the leading and widely known case of 11atter of Marshall,58 Surro-
gate Silkman attempted an answer to the first of these questions. In this case
the executors invested $I5,OOO and $3,ooo respectively in two bonds and
mortgages. They purchased the realty securing the former in 1879, car-
ried it until 1903, and then sold it for $54,5oo. The costs of fore-
closure, carrying charges, and other incidental expenses amounted in all to
$16,174.33. The executors purchased the property securing the $3,000
mortgage in 1875, carried it until 1899, and sold it for the net sum of $9,405.
The cost of carrying the property amounted to $2,108.J5. The surrogate
held that the method used in the Meldon case should be employed, namely,
that the proceeds should be divided in the ratio of the aggregate principal
to the whole unpaid interest. The aggregate principal, he declared, was "the
principal locked up in the property, that is, the original amount of the mort-
gage and the various amounts of principal paid out for taxes, assessments,
etc., from time to time." 59 Later in the course of his opinion, he added the
following explanatory remarks:
"The amount of the foreclosed mortgage, together with the expense
incurred for the foreclosure, the carrying charges, and the amount of
the loss of income suffered, should constitute one common account, and
upon the liquidation of the account by sale of the property taken in, the
interests are to be adjusted and each party, life beneficiary and remain-
derman, is to get 'exactly his own, so far as it is possible to ascertain.'" 60
It is clear, then, that under this decision the "aggregate principal" locked up
in the investment includes the original amount of the mortgage, the expenses
period during which the change was delayed, would .have produced the net proceeds at the
time of change, but in no event shall such income be more than the amount by which the net
proceeds exceed the fair inventory value of the property or in default thereof its market value
at the time the principal was established or its cost where purchased later." This rule follows
in a general way the formula employed in the Roosevelt and Cox cases but differs in two im-
portant respects. (i) It arbitrarily fixes the rate of interest at five per cent, instead of leaving
the rate of interest to vary with the prevailing rate for investments generally. (2) It has an
additional limitation in that the income is in no event to exceed the difference between the net
proceeds of the sale and the fair inventory value of the property, or in default thereof, its
cost where acquired by purchase.
In trusts of unproductive realty accompanied by a mandatory power of sale, a formula
of apportionment similar to that applied in the Roosevelt case is used (see discussion supra
fnote 6), but of coursein such cases no other interest rate than the prevailing one could be
employed.
58. 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Surr. Ct. 19o4).
59. Id. at 241, 88 N. Y. Supp. at 552.
6o. Id. at 243, 88 N. Y. Supp. at 553.
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of foreclosure, and the amounts paid for carrying charges during the period
of ownership.6
The decision was a novel one in that apparently it had not been consid-
ered previously that anything more than the original investment was to be
regarded as principal. In Meldon v. Devlin only the original investment in
the mortgages appears to have been taken as principal, the carrying charges
and expenses having been paid out of income from other parts of the trust
estate. In the recent case of Matter of Jackson 62 no mention is made in the
opinion of the expenses and carrying charges, and the statement by the court
of the computation to be followed indicates that the aggregate principal
included nothing more than the amount of the original investment. On the
other hand, an examination of the record in another New York decision,
In re Myers" Estate,63 indicates that the rules laid down in the Marshall case
were followed. No other decisions, either in New York or in other juris-
dictions, have been found indicating whether foreclosure expenses and carry-
ing charges should be included in the aggregate principal, although the prac-
tice in allocating carrying charges in New Jersey would indicate that there,
at least, the aggregate principal would not include these items.64
The question of what constitutes the "whole unpaid interest" has also
failed to receive the full consideration which it merits. The problem is in
reality a twofold one, involving: (i) the rate which should be adopted during
the period of default under the mortgage up to the date of the acquisition of
title, and (2) the rate which should be adopted during the period of owner-
ship by the trustee; although some courts have not made any distinction
between these two periods. The majority of cases appear to have allowed
interest at some rate or other from the date of the first default until the date
of the ultimate sale.6 5 The case of Matter of Jackson is again of significance
in this regard, however. In the Jackson case interest was allowed only from
61. Whether rents received during the carrying period should be deducted from the
amount calculated as aggregate principal in the ratio taken is a question which will receive
consideration later in this discussion.
62. 135 Misc. 329, 239 N. Y. Supp. 362 (Surr. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 425, 250 N.
Y. Supp. 324 (2d Dep't 1931), redrid on other groutds, 258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932),
reargument denied, 258 N. Y. 61o, x8o N. E. 354 (1932).
63. 161 N. Y. Supp. IIII (Surr. Ct. 1916).
64. Cf. Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Donnelly, 65 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 Atl. 2 (Ch.
19o3) ; Equitable Trust Co. v. Swoboda, 113 N. J. Eq. 399, 167 Atl. 525 (Ch. 1933). This
question cuts so deeply into the problem of the disposition of carrying charges and other ex-
penses incident to the acquisition of title that an opinion as to the advisability of the Marshall
rule will be withheld until the matter of carrying charges is more exhaustively treated in the
text.
65. This was true in the following cases: Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 5 Redf. Surr. 264
(N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1881) ; Meldon v. Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146 (Ist Dep't 1898), af'd, 167 N.Y.
573 (19O) ; it re Myers' Estate, x61 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (Surr. Ct. 1916) ; Matter of Mar-
shall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Surr. Ct. 19o4) ; Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206,
21 Atl. 86o (Ch. 1891) ; In re Tuttle, 491 N. J. Eq. 259, 24 Atl. i (Prerog. 1892) (interest
after death of life tenant to date of sale added to principal for purposes of apportionment) ;
Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Donnelly, 65 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 Atl. 92 (Ch. 19o3).
Um-moRi PRIrzcrPAL AND INCOME Acv § ii allows interest from the date of default until the
date of the ultimate sale or the date when the proceeds of sale are received.
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the time of default until the date on which the trustee accepted a deed to
save the expense of foreclosure. The trustee held the property for nearly
two years thereafter, but no interest appears to have been allowed for that
intervening period, although the court cites and purports to follow the rule
of Meldon v. Devlin.
It is upon the rate of interest that most of the discussion in the cases
centers. The courts in Roosevelt v. Roosevelt and Cox v. Cox allowed the
prevailing rate of interest for investments generally, rather than the mortgage
rate. 66 In Meldon v. Devlin there appears no discussion of the rate of in-
terest allowed, but an examination of the record on appeal reveals that the
interest rate was scaled down, for the entire period of default, from the seven
per cent allowed by the mortgage to six per cent. It does not appear whether
any aspect of the usury laws entered into the decision,67 or whether the court
was merely applying the prevailing rate of interest. In Matter of Marshall
interest was allowed at the mortgage rate until the date of foreclosure, but
the court felt that since interest rates had declined since the date of fore-
closure, it would be inequitable to allow interest during the period of owner-
ship by the trustee at a rate greater than the prevailing one. In Matter of
Jackson it is uncertain what rate of interest was allowed, but it would seem
that it was the mortgage rate until the date of acceptance of the deed in lieu
of foreclosure. No interest was allowed after that date.
In the New Jersey cases no discussion is found of the rate of interest
allowed, but it may be inferred that the mortgage rate was allowed even
down to the date of the ultimate sale. No comment on the rate of interest
to be allowed has been found in any other decisions.
In principle it would seem that the life tenant is entitled to the mortgage
rate of interest until the time of foreclosure, and to the prevailing rate there-
after. To give the life tenant the mortgage rate until foreclosure simply
allows him the amount which he has actually lost on the investment. This
is the most readily ascertainable portion of the sum which, in the language
of the cases, he risks in the joint venture. After foreclosure and the acquisi-
tion of title by the trustee, the mortgage rate can no longer be regarded as the
controlling one; yet the life tenant continues to suffer a loss of income on
the investment. The acquisition of title by the trustee cannot be considered
66. The UNIFORMN PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr § ii arbitrarily fixes the rate of interest
at five per cent for all such periods of conversion.
67. Prior to January I, i88o, the legal rate of interest in New York was seven per cent.
By Chapter 538 of the Laws of 1879, which took effect January I, i88o, the rate was reduced
to six per cent. But it was expressly enacted that nothing in the statute should be construed
to affect any contract or obligation made before the passage of the act. See N. Y. G-xmuI.
BusINESs LAW (909) § 370. The mortgages on the so-called "water lots" in the Meldon
case were received by the trustees from the executor in 1872, prior to the change in the usury
law. The decision, on the other hand, came after the change, and although the statute had
the aforementioned saving clause for contracts already in existence, the court might have been
influenced by this change in the legal rate of interest.
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a reinvestment in real property, 68 since under the principle of equitable con-
version the real estate is looked upon as personalty. 69 The conversion doc-
trine is, of course, an application of the well-known maxim that "equity
regards as done that which ought to be done." It often happens, as in the
case of a trust of unproductive realty with an imperative power of sale, 70
that the life tenant is entitled to the immediate liquidation of an unprofitable
investment and the reinvestment of the proceeds in an income-producing
security. Yet frequently, because of conditions beyond the control of the
trustee, immediate liquidation is impossible, and in fact the actual mutation
does not take place for a considerable period of time. To protect the interests
of the life tenant, equity regards as done that which ought to be done, and by
virtue of the doctrine of equitable conversion declares the life tenant entitled
to a share of the ultimate proceeds on the same basis as though the investment
had been liquidated at the originally prescribed date. His share is computed
at the rate prevailing for trust investments generally, as if the ultimate pro-
ceeds had in fact been reinvested at the time the liquidation was supposed to
have been accomplished.
In the same manner, the purchase of the real estate by the trustee in the
absence of other bidders is regarded as a delay in the liquidation, sufficient
to warrant the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion. 71 The
real estate is therefore considered as that which it ought to be, namely, an
investment in a productive security. On such an investment the life tenant
should be given the rate of interest which he would receive if the investment
were in fact what it is regarded as being. Under this analysis, the prevailing
rate of interest for trust investments generally seems the only logical one
to adopt for the period following foreclosure.
68. Matter of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Surr. Ct. 1904) ; Furniss v.
Cruikshank, 191 App. Div. 450, 181 N. Y. Supp. 522 (xst Dep't 192o), vnodified on other
grounds, 23o N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625 (1921), 231 N. Y. 550, 132 N. E. 884 (1921) ; Valen-
tine v. Belden, 2o Hun 537 (N. Y. i88o) ; In re Park's Estate, 173 Pa. 19o, 33 Ati. 884 (1896);
PERRY, TRuSTS AND TRusmTns (7th ed. 1929) § 458.
69. Matter of Marshall; In re Park's Estate; Valentine v. Belden, all supra note 68;
Lockman v. Reilly, 95 N. Y. 64 (1884); Haberman v. Baker, 128 N. Y. 253, 28 N. E. 370
(iSgi); Wiederhold v. Koehler, 174 App. Div. 139, 16o N. Y. Supp. 927 (2d Dep't 1916);
PoMEROY, E UrTy JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) § 1159.
70. See discussion, supra note 6.
71. At this point there is not a complete analogy to the cases involving trusts of unpro-
ductive realty, since in those cases the intent of the testator to effect an equitable conversion
is the sine qua non, although the intent may be inferred rather than express. The cases in-
volving foreclosed trust properties, however, state that an equitable conversion is effected by
the purchase of the property by the trustee, a development which the testator probably never
contemplated. The requirement of a conversional intent has been questioned even in the field
of trusts of unproductive realty [see Pound, J., in Matter of Jackson, 258 N. Y. 281, 291
(1932) ], and the Uniform Principal -and Income Act has dispensed with it as a prerequisite
in this situation. In a trust of foreclosed realty, the conversion doctrine should not be based
upon a supposed intent of the testator, nor is it so based by the cases. In this connection,
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 820, states: "There is no reason for allocating the
loss directly to capital or to income. No question of intent of settlor or vmortgagor is in-
volved. In foreclosing the trustee was attempting to get back both interest and principal, and
he succeeded only partially in his effort as to each." Italics added.
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In New York the Marshall case has drawn a large following of practi-
tioners to the procedure just outlined. This is not a decision of a court of
last resort, however, and in view of the earlier practice of allowing only the
prevailing rate of interest for the entire period of default, the question may
still be regarded as an open one in New York.
[To be concluded]
